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Seeking Shelter in Personal Insolvency Law: Recession, 
Eviction and Bankruptcy’s Social Safety Net 
 
JOSEPH SPOONER 
Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as social insurance, providing relief and 
a “fresh start” to over-indebted households who fall through gaps in the social safety net. Personal 
insolvency law in England and Wales in practice functions similarly, but in terms of legal principle 
and policy is ambivalent - sometimes emphasising household debt relief, other times creditor 
wealth maximisation. This paper assesses, in the context of novel debt problems brought to 
prominence by recession and austerity, the extent to which the law has embraced personal 
insolvency’s social insurance function. The discussion is framed particularly by the escalating UK 
housing crisis and the case of Places for People v Sharples concerning consumer bankruptcy’s 
(non) protection of debtors from eviction. The analysis illustrates how tensions between 
conceptual understandings and personal insolvency law’s practical operation undermine the law’s 
ability to fulfil its potential to produce positive policy responses to contemporary socio-economic 
challenges.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many legal systems understand consumer insolvency laws as a form of social insurance.1 The 
law’s discharge of debt provides relief to financially troubled households falling outside the 
social safety net and so operates as an “insurer of last resort”. In England and Wales, personal 
insolvency law in practice functions similarly, invoked by debtors of little income and few assets 
to obtain respite from financial difficulty and creditor collection efforts. As a matter of legal 
principle and policy, however, English law is ambivalent in its acceptance of this view of 
personal insolvency law. Instead, policymakers, judges and commentators tend to divide the 
law’s theoretical basis between two primary objectives: debt collection and the maximisation of 
returns to creditors, as well as the provision of debt relief to over-indebted individuals under the 
“fresh start” policy. Underpinning the first of these aims is the view that insolvency law should 
involve “as few dislocations as possible” from pre-bankruptcy market allocations.2 The fresh 
start policy, in contrast, understands that “[v]iewed in its proper context… the law of personal 
insolvency functions as a mechanism of redistribution”.3 Tension exists between these “different 
and perhaps competing philosophical bases for the one legal process”.4 Since insolvency 
“legislation contains no hierarchical system of priorities”,5 the appropriate “balance” between 
the policy concerns is unclear.6  
This paper argues that contemporary economic conditions present a strong case for rebalancing 
the law towards the fresh start policy and its social insurance function. The Global Financial 
Crisis and subsequent Great Recession7 have spurred scholars and policymakers to recognise 
 
1
 See e.g. T. Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer Credit in America (1989) 333; 
A. Feibelman, ‘Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy’ (2005) 13 Am. Bankruptcy 
Institute Law Rev. 129; J. Niemi-Kiesilainen, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market 
Failure or a Social Problem’ (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law J. 473; I. Ramsay, ‘Models of Consumer Bankruptcy: 
Implications for Research and Policy’ (1997) 20 J. of Consumer Policy 269, at 278–282; J. Kilborn, ‘Comparative 
Cause and Effect: Consumer Insolvency and the Eroding Social Safety Net’ (2007) 14 Columbia J. of European 
Law 563. This paper refers widely to comparative literature, while acknowledging that relevant differences in 
credit markets and borrowing practices exist across jurisdictions. The author hopes the paper will be read with 
this in mind, though without wishing to dampen the potential for comparative learning: see e.g. I. Ramsay, 
‘Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy’ (2007) 2007 University of Illinois Law Rev. 241; J. Ziegel, Comparative 
Consumer Insolvency Regimes: A Canadian Perspective (2003); J. Spooner, ‘Fresh Start or Stalemate? European 
Consumer Insolvency Law Reform and the Politics of Household Debt’ (2013) 21(3) European Rev. of Private 
Law 747. The author notes that some ideas explored in the paper are considered further in J. Spooner, The 
Law of Consumer Bankruptcy: A Critical Approach (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). The paper 
frequently uses the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” interchangeably, with the exception of specific 
references to English law, where the bankruptcy procedure is one of four procedures together forming 
personal insolvency law (alongside the Individual Voluntary Arrangement, Debt Relief Notice and County Court 
Administration Order procedures): see e.g. I. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (4
th
 edn., 2009), part I.  
2
 T. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) 253. 
3
 I. Fletcher, op. cit. n 1, para 3–002. 
4
 P. Shuchman, ‘An Attempt at a “Philosophy of Bankruptcy”’ (1973) 21 UCLA Law Rev. 403, at 414. 
5
 D. Milman, ‘The Challenge of Modern Bankruptcy Policy: The Judicial Response.’, in Commercial Law & 
Commercial Practice, ed. S. Worthington (2003) 396. 
6
 C. Hallinan, ‘The Fresh Start Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive 
Theory’ (1986) 21 University of Richmond Law Rev. 49, at 144. 
7
 For a description of the period “popularly termed ‘The Great Recession’”, see for example Kuttner’s account 
of the post-crisis “prolonged slump”: R. Kuttner, ‘Foreword’ in After the Great Recession: The Struggle For 
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the negative economic consequences of excessive household debt in triggering the crisis and in 
prolonging subsequent recession.8 Economists increasingly advocate the merits of household 
debt relief policies, though often seeing “no economy-wide tools available for large-scale debt 
restructuring”.9 Personal insolvency is just such a tool, however, and this paper links this post-
crisis debate with bankruptcy literature. It highlights the persuasive case for deploying personal 
insolvency as a social insurance mechanism to address “debt overhang” problems10 and 
distribute more efficiently the risks inherent in a debt based economy. 
The paper illustrates, however, that the lack of clarity as to how to balance the law’s aims tends 
to obscure the public policy benefits of deploying the law in this manner. It focuses on a stark 
illustration of this problem in the Court of Appeal decision in Places for People Homes Ltd. v 
Sharples. Here a view of personal insolvency centred on creditor returns led to failure to 
recognise the law’s social policy function just as the need for an “insurer of last resort” is 
particularly great, in the context of a contemporary UK housing crisis and an environment of 
recession, austerity and a stretched social safety net. Recent years have seen UK households’ 
debt problems increasingly move from financial products to essential obligations such as 
central and local government debts, as well as rent arrears difficulties symptomatic of the 
housing crisis.11 Perhaps surprisingly, scholars and policymakers have rarely travelled down the 
income distribution curve to consider these “hidden”12 debt problems.13 Existing treatments of 
consumer bankruptcy have tended to focus, for example, on credit card debt during the boom of 
the 2000s14 or the mortgage debt epidemic of the post-crisis crash.15 Consequently, the law must 
now construct fresh responses to questions posed by such debts’ increasing salience and the 
contemporary environment’s challenge to expand protection to those falling outside the social 
safety net.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economic Recovery And Growth, eds. B. Cynamon et al. (2014) xiii. See also A. Turner, Between Debt and the 
Devil: Money, Credit, and Fixing Global Finance (2015) 3. 
8
 Turner, id.; P. Bunn and M. Rostom, ‘Household Debt and Spending’ (2014) Q3 Bank of England Q. Bulletin; A. 
Mian and A. Sufi, House of Debt (2014). 
9
 G. Vlieghe, ‘Debt, Demographics and the Distribution of Income: New Challenges for Monetary Policy’ (Public 
lecture, London School of Economics, 18 January 2016) 3  
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/872.aspx>. 
10
 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 135–151, 162–165; A. Levitin, ‘Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of 
Mortgages in Bankruptcy’ (2009) Wisconsin Law Rev. 565. 
11
 See e.g. London Assembly, Economy Committee, Final Demand: Personal Problem Debt in London (2015); 
StepChange Debt Charity, Council Tax Debts: How to Deal with the Growing Arrears Crisis Tipping Families into 
Problem Debt (2015); Money Advice Trust, Changing Household Budgets (2014). On austerity or "fiscal 
consolidation" policies generally, see M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (2013); W. Streeck, 
Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (2014). 
12
 LSE Housing and Communities, Facing Debt: Economic Resilience in Newham (2014) 19. 
13
 S. Ben-Ishai and S. Schwartz, ‘Bankruptcy for the Poor?’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall Law J. 471, at 473–4; S. Ben-
Ishai et al., ‘The Role of Government as a Creditor of the Disadvantaged’ in Contemporary Issues in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, eds. W. Backert et al. (2013) 201. 
14
 See e.g. I. Ramsay, ‘Consumer Credit Society and Consumer Bankruptcy: Reflections on Credit Cards and 
Bankruptcy in the Informational Economy’, in Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective, eds. J. Niemi-
Kiesiläinen et al. (2003) 17; R. Mann, ‘Bankruptcy Reform and the Sweat Box of Credit Card Debt’ (2007) 
University of Illinois Law Rev. 375; T. Zywicki, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis’ (2004) 
99 Northwestern University Law Rev. 1463. 
15
 See e.g. International Monetary Fund, ‘Dealing with Household Debt’, World Economic Outlook 2012 (2012) 
ch. 3; Bunn and Rostom op. cit., n 8; Levitin op. cit., n 10; J. Taub, Other People’s Houses (2014). 
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This paper is an effort to advance this process. It interrogates the public policy aims of personal 
insolvency law, informed by lessons from the crisis and recession, and applies these ideas to a 
novel debt category through a case study of the Sharples decision.16 In so doing, the paper adds 
to longstanding literature on bankruptcy’s social insurance function and to current academic 
enquiries into the “regulatory welfare state”17 and problems of precarious housing and 
eviction.18 The paper argues that a strong policy case exists for titling the balance of personal 
insolvency law towards the fresh start policy and the law’s social insurance role, even in the 
particular context of protecting debtors from eviction. Such an approach, absent in English law 
as represented by the Sharples case, is necessary to reconcile conceptual understandings of the 
law with its practical operation, and to allow the law to fulfil its potential in producing positive 
public policy responses to contemporary socio-economic challenges.    
 
AMBIVALENCE OF AIMS IN PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY 
 
Many other jurisdictions recognise well the role of personal insolvency law as part of the social 
safety net. In contrast to English law,19 bankruptcy procedures were inaccessible to consumers 
in many European jurisdictions when a mass problem of household over-indebtedness first 
arose in the 1980s. This led to governments enacting a series of bespoke consumer debt-
adjustment laws,20 which provided previously unavailable debt relief to troubled households 
and “were seen as part of the welfare state protection”.21 In France, for example, authors 
characterise the country’s law as “un droit social”,22 and several reforms there formed part of 
wider legislation targeting social exclusion.23 A seminal empirical study of the US system found 
that bankruptcy “must be understood within a broad range of social support systems”,24 and 
that it is “clear that many lawyers see it just that way”.25 Contemporary US authors now describe 
“consumer bankruptcy [as] one of the largest social insurance programs”, providing more to 
 
16
 This approach responds to calls for recognition of the importance of legal doctrine in household debt 
studies: K. Anderson, ‘The Explosive Global Growth of Personal Insolvency and the Concomitant Birth of the 
Study of Comparative Consumer Bankruptcy’ (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall Law J. 661, at 675. 
17
 D. Levi-Faur, ‘The Welfare State: A Regulatory Perspective’ (2014) 92 Public Administration 599; H. Haber, 
‘Regulation as Social Policy: Home Evictions and Repossessions in the Uk and Sweden’ (2015) 93 Public 
Administration 806. 
18
 See e.g. M. Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City (2016). 
19
 English law extended bankruptcy to non-traders in 1861: see An Act to amend the law relating to bankruptcy 
and insolvency in England, 24 & 25 Vict. C. 134; K. Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice : Report of the Review 
Committee (1982) para.42. 
20
 See e.g. J. Kilborn, ‘Two Decades, Three Key Questions, and Evolving Answers in European Consumer 
Insolvency Law: Responsibility, Discretion, and Sacrifice’, in Consumer Credit, Debt and Bankruptcy, eds. J. 
Niemi et al. (2009) 307. 
21
 Niemi-Kiesilainen, op. cit., n 1, 481. 
22
 I. Ramsay, ‘A Tale of Two Debtors: Responding to the Shock of Over‐Indebtedness in France and England – a 
Story from the Trente Piteuses’ (2012) 75 The Modern Law Rev. 212, at 234. 
23
 Projet de loi d’orientation relative à la lutte contre les exclusions, (Projet de loi n
o 
1055); Loi no 2003-710 du 
1er août 2003 d’orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la renovation urbaine. 
24
 Sullivan, et al., op. cit., n 1, 333. 
25
 T. Sullivan et al., The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt (2000) 169. 
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households than all state unemployment insurance programs combined.26 Even in nearby 
Scotland, policymakers appear to conceptualise personal insolvency law in welfare state terms, 
with recent reforms promising a national “financial health service”.27      
This paper explores the extent to which one can see English personal insolvency law in this 
manner, particularly as contemporary economic conditions pressurise a shrinking social safety 
net and challenge the law to act as a social insurer of last resort. In terms of express policy 
statements, English law appears not to be fully committed to this view of the law. Rather it 
seems to adhere to a "firmly established tenet of time-worn bankruptcy lore… that the 
bankruptcy system serves two functions: the protection and payment of creditors; and the 
provision of shelter and a 'fresh start' to overburdened debtors".28 After an initial dominance of 
the debt collection objective,29 the history of the law’s development has involved efforts to seek 
“an appropriate balance of bankruptcy’s collection and debtor rehabilitation goals”.30 The 
precise calibration of this balance has varied at different historical moments.31 A landmark in 
establishing debt relief as “a legitimate independent objective”32 was bankruptcy law’s 
introduction in 1976 of automatic debt discharge on completion of the insolvency process,33 
independent of creditor consent or returns to creditors.34 This objective was advanced further 
by the Insolvency Act 1986, which reduced the debtor’s waiting period for discharge to just 
three years.35 This reform followed a key policy report that recognised the fresh start principle 
as a basic aim of insolvency law.36 More recent policy developments have tilted the balance ever 
further towards this aim, while nonetheless reiterating the importance of debt collection. The 
Enterprise Act 2002 advanced the fresh start policy37 by reducing the discharge waiting period 
to just 12 months.38 It also replaced the automatic restrictions and disqualifications previously 
applicable to all bankrupts with a narrower system of sanctions for culpable debtors.39 
Policymakers expressly justified these reforms by reference to the “fresh start” or “second 
chance” philosophy, arguing that a more lenient debt discharge would facilitate 
 
26
 W. Dobbie and J. Song, ‘Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of Consumer Bankruptcy 
Protection’ (2015) 105 Am. Economic Rev. 1272, at 1272. 
27
 D. McKenzie Skene, ‘Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est La Même Chose? The Reform of Bankruptcy Law in Scotland’ 
(2015) 3 Nottingham Insolvency Business Law eJournal 285, at 292 
<https://www4.ntu.ac.uk/nls/document_uploads/174831.pdf>. 
28
 Hallinan, op. cit., n 6, at 50. See also E. Warren, ‘A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy’ (1997) 71 
Am. Bankruptcy Law J. 483, at 483; I. Fletcher, ‘Bankruptcy Law Reform: The Interim Report of the Cork 
Committee, and the Department of Trade Green Paper’ (1981) 44 The Modern Law Rev. 77, at 81. 
29
 M. Howard, ‘A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy’ (1987) 48 Ohio State Law J. 1047, at 1049; C. 
Tabb, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge’ (1991) 65 Am. Bankruptcy Law J. 325; A. Duncan, 
‘From Disemberment to Discharge: The Origins of Modern American Bankruptcy Law’ (1995) 100 Commercial 
Law J. 191. 
30
 Howard, id., at 1082. See also D. Skeel, Debt’s Dominion : A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (2001) 210. 
31
 Skene, op. cit., n 27, at 297. 
32
 Hallinan, op. cit., n 6, at 60; English law eliminated the creditor consent condition in 1842 (5 & 6 Vict., c. 122, 
s.39 (1842)), but reintroduced it in 1869 (32 & 33 Vict., c. 71, s.48 (1869)). It was revoked in 1883 but replaced 
by a system of limited, conditional and suspended debt discharges:  Tabb, op. cit., n 29, at 354.  
33
 Insolvency Act 1976 ss 7-8; I. Fletcher, Law of Bankruptcy (1978) 308–9. 
34
 Duncan, op. cit., n 29, at 199; Tabb, op. cit., n 29, at 337. 
35
 Insolvency Act 1986 s.279. 
36
 Cork, op. cit., n 19, 192. 
37
 See especially The Insolvency Service, Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start (2000). 
38
 Enterprise Act 2002 s.256, substituting Insolvency Act 1986 s.279. 
39
 Id. s.257, Schd. 20, inserting Insolvency Act 1986, s.281A, Schd. 4A. 
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entrepreneurship by encouraging business risk-taking.40 Nonetheless, policymakers emphasised 
the idea that debtors who “can pay, should pay” as a “key element of our bankruptcy system”.41 
Reforms simultaneously enhanced procedures requiring bankrupt debtors to contribute income 
to creditors for up to three years.42 Similar balance was evident in proposals by Government 
agency the Insolvency Service to modernise the Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA) 
insolvency procedure, which recognised both the need “to support the concept of a fresh start” 
and “to ensure the debtor pays the maximum affordable contribution”.43 The introduction of the 
Debt Relief Order procedure (DRO) in 200944 represented a more complete evolution. As 
confirmed by the courts, “the purpose of the DRO scheme is unadulterated debt relief”,45 and it 
involves no contributions to creditors from the debtor’s assets/income. Instead, low-income 
debtors with very few assets owing limited amounts of debt simply obtain initial provisional 
protection from enforcement for one year, followed by full discharge of all non-excluded debts.46 
Even in proposing this means-tested mechanism, policymakers reiterated “that people who can 
pay… should do”, and indicated that the bankruptcy procedure would ensure debtors of greater 
means make repayments to creditors.47 The Insolvency Service’s 2014 Call for Evidence further 
exemplifies this disunity of purpose. It considered concurrently a loosening of the restrictive 
means-based DRO access conditions (thus expanding debt relief), and amendments to the 
bankruptcy creditor petition procedure that left unquestioned bankruptcy’s status as the 
“strongest of debt recovery tools”.48  
Policymakers thus continue to view the law as serving simultaneously the aims of maximising 
returns to creditors and offering debtors a fresh start, while enacting recent reforms that have 
increasingly recognised the latter objective. The difficulty with this position is that many policy 
decisions and litigated questions involve a direct choice between these two aims, creating 
tension and risking the law’s failure to achieve one or both objectives. In order to reconcile 
these aims and to evaluate where the law’s priority should lie, it is necessary to interrogate the 
theoretical underpinnings of each objective. The paper now proceeds to do this, arguing that 
both lessons from the Great Recession and the contemporary practice of personal insolvency 
law undermine key assumptions of the debt collection objective, suggesting public policy 
benefits to tilting the law’s balance towards debt relief and embracing its social insurance 
function. 
 
40
 The Insolvency Service; Department for Trade and Industry, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency - A 
Second Chance (2001). 
41
 id., para.1.9. 
42
 Enterprise Act 2002 s. 260, inserting Insolvency Act 1986 s. 310A. 
43
 Insolvency Service, Improving Individual Voluntary Arrangements (2005) paras 13, 21. For insight into the IVA 
procedure, see Adrian Walters, ‘Individual Voluntary Arrangements: A “fresh Start” for Salaried Consumer 
Debtors in England and Wales’ (2009) 18 International Insolvency Rev. 5. 
44
 See Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (2007 c. 15), Ch. 5 Part 3, Schds. 18-19; Insolvency Act 1986, 
Part VIIA, Schds. 4ZA-4ZB; The Insolvency Service, Relief For The Indebted - An Alternative To Bankruptcy 
(2005); Department of Constitutional Affairs, A Choice Of Paths: Better Options to Manage Over-Indebtedness 
and Multiple Debt (2004) 
45
 R (Cooper and Payne) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Court of Appeal, England and Wales [2010] 
EWCA Civ. 1431, [2011] BPIR 223 [85], per Toulson LJ. 
46
 A debtor can be sanctioned and subjected to the suspension of her discharge in the event of misconduct. 
47
 The Insolvency Service op. cit. n 44, 22, 3. 
48
 Insolvency Service, Insolvency Proceedings: Debt Relief Orders and the Bankruptcy Petition Limit: Call for 
Evidence (2014), Foreword. 
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DEVELOPING A HIERARCHICAL SYSTEM OF PRIORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY 
PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW AND POLICY 
 
1. Personal Insolvency and Creditor Wealth Maximisation  
 
Certain commentators describe the “standard justification for bankruptcy”49 as being to serve 
the objective of debt collection or maximising returns to creditors. Sharing much with classical 
contract law theory,50 this view founds itself on neo-classical economic ideas, which adhere 
closely to the efficient market hypothesis and see the law’s role as supporting the market’s 
production of efficient resource allocation. The law should define property rights,51 establish 
ground rules for the free transfer of these rights,52 and enforce contractual bargains in order to 
protect market expectations.53 Bankruptcy law becomes an extension of contract law in its 
fundamental objective of upholding market bargains to the greatest extent possible. This 
position is clear in Professor Jackson’s “creditors’ bargain” model, which scholars regard as the 
most notable unified theory of bankruptcy law.54 Here “the basic role of bankruptcy law is to 
translate relative values of non-bankruptcy entitlements into bankruptcy’s collective forum 
with as few dislocations as possible.”55 In this view, bankruptcy primarily addresses a collective 
action problem of the “tragedy of the commons”, as multiple creditors compete to enforce 
unilaterally their market entitlements from a single pool of the insolvent debtor’s limited 
resources. Bankruptcy law then provides a solution to which creditors hypothetically would 
agree, by offering a collective procedure of compulsory cooperation.56 All creditors benefit from 
the “bargain” of the law’s stay on individual creditor enforcement efforts, centralised acquisition 
and sharing of information regarding a debtor’s assets, and distribution of these assets’ 
liquidated proceeds among creditors on a pro rata basis.57 Thus, the stay of enforcement actions 
or moratorium58 represents the core of the creditors’ bargain. It gives bankruptcy law its key 
collective nature, preventing individual advantage-taking59 and preserving equality of creditors. 
Debt discharge is justified under this perspective only as a means of encouraging debtors to 
 
49
 A. Walters, ‘Personal Insolvency Law after the Enterprise Act: An Appraisal’ (2005) 5 J. of Corporate Law 
Studies 65, at 69. 
50
 See e.g. R. Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes For The Twenty-First Century (2nd edn., 2006) 46–47; P. 
Atiyah, The Rise And Fall Of Freedom Of Contract (1979); Michael Trebilcock, The Limits Of Freedom Of 
Contract (Harvard University Press 1997) 9–15 
51
 Trebilcock, id., 9–15; M. Stearns and T. Zywicki, Stearns and Zywicki’s Public Choice Concepts and 
Applications in Law (2009) 18. 
52
 Trebilcock, op. cit., n 50, 9, 15–7. 
53
 G. Howells and S. Weatherill, Consumer Protection Law (2nd edn., 2005) 8. 
54
 See e.g. A. Levitin, ‘Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy’ (2011) 97 Cornell Law Rev. 1399, at 
1404–5; R. Mokal, ‘The Authentic Consent Model: Contractarianism, Creditor’s Bargain, and Corporate 
Liquidation’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400, at 401–2. 
55
 Jackson, op. cit. , n 2, 253.  
56
 Id., 10–4. 
57
 See e.g. V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd edn, 2009) 32–7. 
58
 See Insolvency Act 1986, s.285 
59
 See e.g. Stearns and Zywicki, op. cit., n 51, 13–4. 
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cooperate in liquidating assets for creditors’ benefit. Pro rata distribution of the debtor’s assets 
among creditors supports market allocations, “because it mimics the value of [creditors’] 
expected positions immediately before bankruptcy”.60 By facilitating predictable pro-rata 
recovery (rather than the unpredictable outcome of case-by-case races-to-court), insolvency 
law should assist business planning, reduce wasteful creditor competition, and produce more 
accurate and lower pricing of credit.61 Ultimately, therefore, the case for maximising returns to 
creditors rests on the belief that this will allow credit to be most widely available at the lowest 
cost, and faith that this equates with an efficient allocation of resources.  
2. The Fresh Start Policy and Personal Insolvency as Social Insurance 
 
This position rests on assumptions regarding market efficiency, however, which struggle to hold 
in the face of contemporary conditions in consumer credit markets. The market failure rationale 
justifies personal insolvency’s provision to debtors of relief from sub-optimal bargains 
produced by imperfect consumer credit markets.62 Information asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers and behavioural biases of consumers will systematically produce inefficient 
credit contracts.63 The resulting severe costs of over-indebtedness are not just borne by parties 
to credit transactions but also by third parties, meaning that rather than enforce market 
allocations, personal insolvency has a role to play in internalising negative externalities. These 
social costs are multifarious, including for example expense to State social welfare systems in 
providing for financially troubled households’ basic needs.64 The recognised links between debt 
and health problems mean that mass over-indebtedness may also burden healthcare systems.65 
The “most powerful driving concerns”66 of policymakers are wider systemic macro-economic 
costs of over-indebtedness. Debt problems may reduce employees’ economic productivity, 
pushing debtors from the workforce either by making work uneconomical or through health 
problems that render employees unfit for work.67 Similarly, English68 and EU policymakers69 
 
60
 Jackson, op. cit., n 2, 30–1; J. Kilpi, The Ethics of Bankruptcy (1998) 14–5. 
61
 Jackson, op. cit., n 2, 14–6. 
62
 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 137–9. Personal insolvency law is not a perfect response to such market 
problems, as it affects rights of all creditors, not just those engaging in risky practices: W. Whitford, ‘The Ideal 
of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in 
Consumer Bankruptcy’ (1994) 68 Am. Bankruptcy Law J. 397, at 401, 403. It therefore fits alongside more 
targeted regulatory measures, both in deterring future inappropriate creditor conduct and in providing often 
the only practical form of ex post consumer redress. See also U. Reifner et al, Overindebtedness in European 
Consumer Law: Principles from 15 European States (2010) 50–51.  
63
 See generally R. Mann, ‘Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy’ (2006) 7 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 395; O. Bar-Gill and E. Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Rev. 1; L. Willis, ‘Will the Mortgage Market Correct - How Households and Communities Would Fare If Risk 
Were Priced Well’ (2008) 41 Connecticut Law Rev. 1177. 
64
 Reifner et al, op. cit., n 62, 62. 
65
 See e.g. S. Emami, ‘Consumer Over-Indebtedness And Health Care Costs: How To Approach The Question 
From A Global Perspective’ in WHO World Health Report, World Health Organisation (2010); N. Balmer et al, 
‘Worried Sick: The Experience Of Debt Problems And Their Relationship With Health, Illness And Disability’ 
(2006) 5 Soc. Policy Soc. 39 
66
 World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons (2013) para.77. 
67
 id., paras.102–5; Jackson, op. cit., n 2, 244; Hallinan, op. cit., n 6, at 119. Recent empirical research finds 
better employment and income outcomes for US debtors accessing bankruptcy protection compared to those 
refused access: Dobbie and Song, op. cit., n 26, at 1792–1797. One UK study finds strong links between 
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have seen debt relief laws as important facilitators of entrepreneurial productivity, safety nets 
that facilitate risk-taking necessary for business activity.70 In contemporary conditions in which 
consumer demand is essential to economic growth, this logic suggests debt relief laws are 
equally necessary to restore over-indebted consumers to economically productive positions in 
which they can resume spending.71 In response to the Great Recession, academic authors and 
international organisations have increasingly recognised the “debt overhang” problem of 
household over-indebtedness’ disastrous effects on aggregate demand and so on economic 
growth.72 The “harshness of debt”73 inflicts losses of an economic downturn on borrowers (as 
employment, incomes and home values fall), while leaving creditors untouched with claims to 
full loan repayment and recourse to security. As borrowers are the members of society with the 
highest marginal propensity to consume, debt’s distribution of losses onto borrowers leads to 
dramatic falls in consumption, triggering economic downturn. This calls for policies to 
redistribute losses more evenly, through contractual loss sharing mechanisms and expansive 
debt relief laws,74 in order to restore debtors’ ability to engage in growth-facilitating 
consumption.75  
The Great Recession’s lesson that “debt matters” to economic growth and stability,76 and that 
the inherent risks of a debt-based economy must be redistributed more efficiently, heightens 
understanding of personal insolvency law as a form of socio-economic or social insurance.77 
Bankruptcy satisfies economic definitions of insurance, transferring risk from debtors (the 
insured) to creditors (insurers) through the discharge of debt, with debtors paying a risk-
adjusted premium in the form of an interest rate.78 By discharging consumer debts, the law 
redistributes costs of over-indebtedness from consumer debtors (and third parties who bear 
costs where debtors do not self-insure) to institutional creditors, who represent the party better 
able both to prevent default from occurring (through creditworthiness assessments and 
underwriting practices) and to bear the costs of default (as discussed further below). This 
allows social costs of credit markets to be efficiently spread and internalised, and incentivises 
creditors to reduce the incidence of default and over-indebtedness.  
More practically, one could understand bankruptcy as functionally acting as social insurance, 
filling gaps left by the Welfare State.79 Though the continued vital role of the existing social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
households being in debt and leaving paid employment: E. Kempson et al., Characteristics of Households in 
Debt and the Nature of Indebtedness (2004) 5. 
68
 The Insolvency Service; Department for Trade and Industry, op. cit., n 40; The Insolvency Service, n 37. 
69
 European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a New Approach to Business Failure 
and Insolvency’ (2014). 
70
 See also J. Czarnetzky, ‘The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the Bankruptcy Discharge’ (2000) 32 Arizona 
State Law J.l 393; World Bank op. cit., n 66, 106–10. 
71
 International Monetary Fund, op. cit., n 15, 1-3, 7–8; Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8. 
72
 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8; Bunn and Rostom, op. cit., n 8; Turner, op. cit., n 7. 
73
 Mian and Sufi op. cit., n 8, 18–19. 
74
 International Monetary Fund, op. cit., n 15; World Bank, op. cit., n 66. 
75
 Mian and Sufi op. cit., n 8, 135–151, 167–87 
76
 Vlieghe, op. cit., n 9, 2. 
77
 Hallinan, op. cit., n 6, 98–109; Jackson op. cit., n 2, 229–32; T. Eisenberg, ‘Bankruptcy Law in Perspective’ 
(1980) 28 UCLA Law Rev. 953, at 981–3; R. Hynes, ‘Non-Procrustean Bankruptcy’ (2004) University of Illinois 
Law Rev. 301, at 327–31. 
78
 Feibelman, op. cit., n 1, at 130. 
79
 See e.g. J. Braucher, ‘Response to Eric Posner’ (2001) 7 Fordham J. of Corporate & Financial Law 463, at 466. 
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welfare system should not be understated, the dramatic rise in household debt of recent 
decades has corresponded to a period of reduced welfare provision, as well as increased income 
inequality and stagnation of wage growth for middle and working classes.80 These trends have 
involved a substitution of “loans for wages”81 and official promotion of borrowing as a means of 
sustaining economic demand82 and of smoothing consumption in a manner analogous to 
traditional welfare state provision.83 Reduced social spending has seen the financialisation of 
welfare and the increasing role of the market, rather than the State, in addressing citizens’ social 
needs.84 Evidence from the Great Recession shows households borrowing to counter austerity 
policies’ reduction of social welfare provision,85 while significant increases in high cost payday 
lending in the UK86 illustrate further this substitution of private debt for public debt. 87 Debt is 
also used to access “essential services no longer provided by the welfare state”,88 including 
housing and pension provision.89 Household credit then becomes the “ultimate market-based 
social welfare programme”.90 This ex ante borrowing exposes heavily leveraged households to 
greater vulnerability ex post in the event of an “income shock” or social force majeure that 
typically leads to over-indebtedness – job loss, wage reduction, relationship breakdown, or ill 
health.91 These “life accidents” are of the kind against which the welfare state traditionally 
protects. Privatisation and the State’s promotion of market provision in lieu of social spending, 
transform the State from service provider to regulator,92 and create a “regulatory welfare 
state”.93 Regulatory norms and legal protections, such as personal insolvency law, accordingly 
must provide a “safety net of last resort”, when the net of the traditional Welfare State has 
failed.94  
These analyses suggest that developments in economic and social policy over past decades, 
accelerated by recent conditions of recession and austerity, present a clear and urgent policy 
case for personal insolvency to function as insurance against the risks of excessive debt, both at 
the individual and aggregate levels. This calls on the law to be expansive in its discharge of debt 
 
80
 P. Lucchino and S. Morelli, Inequality, Debt and Growth (2012); J. Wisman, ‘Wage Stagnation, Rising 
Inequality and the Financial Crisis of 2008’ (2013) 37 Cambridge J. of Economics 921; Turner, op. cit., n 7, 119–
124. 
81
 A. Barba and M. Pivetti, ‘Rising Household Debt: Its Causes and Macroeconomic Implications—a Long-Period 
Analysis’ (2009) 33 Cambridge J.l of Economics 113. 
82
 C. Crouch, ‘Privatised Keynesianism: An Unacknowledged Policy Regime’ (2009) 11 The Brit. J. of Politics & 
International Relations 382. 
83
 J. Hills, Good Times, Bad Times: The Welfare Myth of Them and Us (2014) 49–61. 
84
 G. Gloukoviezoff, Understanding and Combating Financial Exclusion and Overindebtedness in Ireland: A 
European Perspective (2011) 44–5. 
85
 E. Herden, A. Power and B. Provan, ‘Is Welfare Reform Working? Impacts on Working Age Tenants’ (2015) 5–
6, 12. 
86
 See Office of Fair Trading, Payday Lending: Compliance Review Final Report (2013). 
87
 Barba and Pivetti, op. cit., n 87, at 129–131. 
88
 S. Soederberg, Debtfare States and the Poverty Industry: Money, Discipline and the Surplus Population (2014) 
89. 
89
 J. Montgomerie and M. Büdenbender, ‘Round the Houses: Homeownership and Failures of Asset-Based 
Welfare in the United Kingdom’ (2015) 20 New Political Economy 386. 
90
 Sullivan et al., op. cit., n 25, 138. 
91
 European Commission et al, Towards A Common Operational European Definition of Over-Indebtedness 
(2008) 23–4. 
92
 Ramsay, op. cit., n 22, at 247. 
93
 Haber, op. cit., n 17. 
94
 id., at 817–819. 
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and, most relevantly to the subsequent discussion, in the protection offered by its stay of 
enforcement, “the linchpin of bankruptcy relief”.95  
 
3. Objections to Personal Insolvency’s Social Insurance Function 
 
While at least part of the above analysis regarding the economic costs of household over-
indebtedness may be widely accepted, two key objections tend to oppose the complete embrace 
of debt relief and adoption of the law’s social insurance function. The first worries that debtors 
will abuse any system of debt relief, while the second cautions that such a system will raise the 
costs of, and reduce access to, credit.96 Both of these are common concerns regarding consumer 
protection and social insurance measures generally,97 mirroring the classic reactionary 
argument that reforms will produce opposite effects to those intended by policymakers.98 When 
interrogated, however, these objections do not undermine the case for accepting personal 
insolvency law’s social insurance role.  
(a) Moral Hazard 
The first argument against household debt relief measures cautions that debtors will abuse 
generous laws, over-borrowing and subsequently escaping their credit obligations. This raises 
the issue of moral hazard,99 the risk that the availability of insurance against loss (debt 
discharge) will reduce the insured’s (debtor’s) incentives to take steps to prevent default (i.e. 
borrowing responsibly and striving to overcome financial difficulties).100 Often overlooked, 
however, is the fact that moral hazard’s original “significance lay not in the recognition that 
insurance could have undesirable consequences…, but instead in the claim that the undesirable 
consequences could be controlled.”101 Similarly, personal insolvency systems can use this 
concept as a guide in designing the law with sufficient safeguards and sanctions “to isolate and 
exclude debtors who engage in excessively risky or other undesirable credit behaviour.”102 
While the social insurance view of bankruptcy sees the availability of debt relief as welfare 
enhancing, it sees an important need to attach conditions to raise the cost of debt relief (just as 
insurance policies include deductibles to ensure insured risks are not costless). These include 
limitations on debtor access (as seen above in relation to the DRO procedure), investigation and 
potential sanction of culpable debtors, and the debtor’s sacrifice to creditors of non-essential 
income and assets. Thus, the social insurance conception of insolvency retains a role for debt 
 
95
 J. Kilborn, ‘Mercy, Rehabilitation, and Quid Pro Quo: A Radical Reassessment of Individual Bankruptcy’ 
(2003) 64 Ohio State Law . 855, at 893. 
96
 See e.g. E. Posner, ‘Comment on Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy by Jean Braucher’ (2001) 7 Fordham J. 
of Corporate & Financial Law 457, at 458–9. 
97
 Kilborn, op. cit., n 1, at 595. 
98
 A. Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (1991) 11. Baker notes that moral 
hazard is used similarly to caution against "the perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the 
burdens of life": T. Baker, ‘On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard’ (1996) 75 Texas Law Rev. 237, at 239. 
99
 See e.g. Baker id.; Joseph E Stiglitz, ‘Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard’ (1983) 
8 The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice 4. 
100
 Hallinan, op. cit., n 6, at 84, 92, 103; Hynes, op. cit., n 77, at 329; Feibelman, op. cit., n 1, at 136–7. 
101
 Baker, op. cit., n 98, at 240. 
102
 World Bank, op. cit., n 66, para.114. 
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collection, but as a means of guarding against moral hazard, rather than an end in itself. In this 
light, requiring debtors to undergo a personal insolvency procedure appears more as a solution 
to, rather than a cause of, moral hazard problems posed by household debt relief policies.103 
(b) “Lenders should feel able to advance money”  
A second perennial objection to introducing debtor friendly law reforms is the claim that they 
will increase the cost of, and reduce access to, household credit.104 Examples abound of 
policymakers, judges and commentators105 expressing assumptions that laws that maximise 
returns to creditors, and particularly protect banks, enhance welfare in allowing creditors to 
supply credit widely at low prices.106 The belief that it is “important that lenders should feel able 
to advance money”107 approaches the status of an article of faith in an English private law 
alleged to demonstrate an “enduring pro-creditor bias”.108 In the context of the “debt overhang” 
problem discussed above, typical arguments that the “sky will fall” 109 if creditors’ rights are 
unduly restricted raise a more nuanced question: whether a reduction in supply of cheap 
household credit would cause greater harm to economic activity than the fall in demand caused 
by overly leveraged households’ declining consumption.  
It is precisely this point that contemporary commentators refute when arguing that the severity 
of the Great Recession indeed resulted from policymakers allowing losses to fall on debtors and 
“behaving as if the preservation of bank creditor and shareholder value is the only policy 
goal.”110 Moving from this more general claim to the direct impact of bankruptcy on credit 
supply, empirical evidence is “surprisingly limited… given the centrality of [this point] to policy 
debates about bankruptcy reform”.111 Some studies produce ambiguous results,112 while others 
find small increases in mortgage prices attributable to differences in bankruptcy laws.113 Yet 
more conclude that in modern securitised, diversified credit markets, “the scope of the 
bankruptcy discharge has very little impact on the price or availability of credit except at the 
margins.”114 Creditors “can spread, diversify and hedge investments to minimise total portfolio 
 
103
 See e.g. Levitin, op. cit., n 10, at 640–647. 
104
 J. Goodman and A. Levitin, ‘Bankruptcy Law and the Cost of Credit: The Impact of Cramdown on Mortgage 
Interest Rates’ (2014) 57 J. of Law and Economics 139, at 139–142; Taub, op. cit., n 15, 117–118. 
105
 For examples of such views among scholars, see e.g. F. McIntyre et al., ‘Lawyers Steer Clients Toward 
Lucrative Filings: Evidence from Consumer Bankruptcies’ (2015) 17 Am. Law and Economics Rev. 245, at 278, 
280; S. Nield, ‘Responsible Lending and Borrowing: Whereto Low-Cost Home Ownership’ (2010) 30 Legal 
Studies 610. 
106
 Mian and Sufi, op cit., n 10, 119–133. 
107
 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 A.C. 773, [2], per Lord Nicholls. In this 
decision, Lord Hobhouse criticised this trend, arguing at [115] that “[t]he law has, in order to accommodate 
the commercial lenders, adopted a fiction which nullifies the equitable principle [of undue influence] and 
deprives vulnerable members of the public of the protection which equity gives them.”  
108
 L. Fox O’Mahoney et al, ‘England and Wales’, in Regulating Unfair Banking Practices in Europe: the Case of 
Personal Suretyships, eds. A. Colombi Ciacchi & S. Weatherill (2010) 141, at 170. 
109
 L. Lupica, ‘The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position’ (2008) 40 Loyola University 
Chicago Law J. 557, at 604. 
110
 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 133, 46–59. 
111
 Goodman and Levitin, op. cit., n 104, at 141. 
112
 T. Durkin et al, Consumer Credit and the American Economy (2014) 613–4. 
113
 Goodman and Levitin, op. cit., n 104. 
114
 Levitin, op. cit., n 10, 648, at 601–2. 
  
13 
 
risk” in a manner unavailable to individual debtors,115 for whom an adverse financial event will 
most likely be uninsured116 and can prove catastrophic.117 Financial creditors are regulated 
entities, obliged to hold capital reserves designed to protect against such losses. The UK’s 
estimated 8.8 million over-indebted people118 and the £2.75 billion in non-mortgage debt 
charged off by lenders annually119 mean that losses attributable to England and Wales’ 80,000 
annual personal insolvencies120 reflect only a small portion of total defaults. These observations 
suggest that losses to creditors caused by providing greater debt relief in personal insolvency 
law should reduce lender economic activity (i.e. credit supply) to a lesser extent than the denial 
of relief will affect over-indebted individuals’ behaviour (i.e. consumer spending), particularly 
bearing in mind debtors’ higher marginal propensity to consume. A key insight of insurance 
theory, that the law can produce efficient outcomes by allocating losses onto the party best 
placed to bear loss and to prevent relevant risks from occurring,121 therefore supports debt 
relief as an efficient transfer of costs onto creditors. A further lesson from the Great Recession is 
that shifting losses onto debtors may in fact reduce credit flows by stifling demand, since a two-
sided market view shows that boom time borrowers will have little appetite for credit when 
economic conditions deteriorate.122  
A more fundamental problem with this typical objection to debt relief is its assumption, 
foundational to ubiquitous pre-crisis “democratisation of credit” policies,123  that wide access to 
cheap credit is necessarily welfare enhancing. The contribution of excessive household debt to 
the financial crisis, and the effect of the consequent “debt overhang” problem in inducing 
recession, has led many commentators to doubt this assumption and argue “less finance can be 
better”.124 This recognition of the need for caution regarding the wide supply of debt at a price 
concealing its true social costs125 builds on the pre-crisis emergence of the regulatory principle 
of responsible lending.126 Considering these ideas, personal insolvency’s role may be precisely to 
reduce debt flows and ensure that credit markets’ costs are internalised through truer pricing, 
rather than to enforce market bargains blindly. In this way, those outcomes feared by 
opponents of debt relief should actually benefit the wider economy, while also providing 
valuable over-indebtedness insurance for which individual debtors may be happy to pay.127 
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 Willis, op. cit., n 63, at 1182. 
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 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 46–59. 
117
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 Money Advice Service, Indebted Lives: The Complexities of Life in Debt (2013). 
119
 Bank of England, Bankstats (Monetary & Financial Statistics) - Latest Tables 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/current/default.aspx>. 
120
 Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics - October to December 2015 (Q4 2015) (2016). 
121
 World Bank, op. cit., n 66, 94–98; Eisenberg, op. cit., n 83, at 981; R. Posner and A. Rosenfield, ‘Impossibility 
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 J. of Legal Studies 83. 
122
 See e.g. Bunn and Rostom, op. cit., n 8. 
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 Soederberg, op. cit., n 88, 61–65. 
124
 Turner, op. cit., n 7, 17; Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 127. 
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 Mian and Sufi, op. cit., n 8, 182. 
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 See e.g. I. Ramsay, ‘From Truth in Lending to Responsible Lending’, in Information Rights and Obligations: 
The Impact on Party Autonomy and Contractual Fairness, eds. A. Janssen and G. Howells (2005) 47; K. 
Fairweather, ‘The Development of Responsible Lending in the UK Consumer Credit Regime’ in Consumer 
Credit, Debt and Investment in Europe, eds. J. Devenney and M. Kenny (2012) 84. 
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4. No Commons, Just Tragedy: Maintaining Personal Insolvency’s Debt Collection 
Objective when there is Nothing Left to Collect  
 
The contemporary conditions of personal insolvency law’s operation provide a final, compelling, 
factor in favour of understanding personal insolvency law as a form of social insurance and of 
emphasising its debt relief aim. All Debt Relief Order cases and the vast majority of bankruptcies 
involve consumer debtors (Figure 1) seeking protection by voluntarily initiating proceedings, 
rather than creditors coercively petitioning for bankruptcy in order to collect debts (Figure 
2).128 In fact, it is precisely those debtors unwilling or unable to make repayments to creditors 
who use the bankruptcy and DRO procedures. Other options such as the IVA procedure or non-
statutory Debt Management Plans (DMPs) are available to debtors able to make part 
repayments. The steering effects of intermediaries providing these arrangements129 mean that 
debtors with saleable assets or available income (to pay both creditors’ debts and 
intermediaries’ fees) are less likely to enter bankruptcy. 130 As a result, all DRO debtors and most 
bankruptcy debtors have few if any non-essential assets available for distribution to creditors 
(Figure 3).  
Irrespective of the theoretical conception of bankruptcy, given that the debtor now usually lacks 
assets and income for recovery to creditors, the “predominant purpose - if not the sole purpose - 
of individual bankruptcy today is to effect the discharge of debts - to give the debtor a ‘fresh 
start’”.131 There is simply nothing left to collect in any bankruptcies bar a small unrepresentative 
minority of high value cases. Personal insolvency law may once have operated alongside 
corporate insolvency law as a commercial law designed to recover returns to investors from 
failed business debtors. It now operates, however, as a social welfare law or “law of hardship”.132 
Stakeholders working with the law recognise this, with debt charities viewing insolvency 
mechanisms as a “lifeline”133 for impoverished clients and part of a “debt solutions 
landscape”,134 rather than legal or judicial processes.135 Similarly, in its recent review of this 
landscape, the Financial Conduct Authority treated “insolvency/statutory solutions” as just one 
of many wide-ranging “options for dealing with problem debt”.136 The specialist credit regulator 
positioned bankruptcy at one end of a spectrum of options, many of which are indisputably 
welfarist in nature, such as “help with budgeting”. Viewed in this light, it is easier to see 
 
128
 The split personality of English personal insolvency law means that this small minority of “involuntary” 
bankruptcies nonetheless remains higher than equivalent rates in jurisdictions such as the USA: J. Kilborn and 
Adrian Walters, ‘Involuntary Bankruptcy As Debt Collection: Multi-Jurisdictional Lessons in Choosing the Right 
Tool for the Job’ (2013) 87 Am. Bankruptcy Law J. 123, at 124–5. 
129
 Financial Conduct Authority, Quality of Debt Management Advice (2015). 
130
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creditors: Insolvency Service, Insolvency Statistics: April to June 2016 (28 July 2016).  
131
 Kilborn, op. cit., n 95, at 866. 
132
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Evidence (2014) 3. 
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Bankruptcy Petition Limit (2014) 4. 
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“consumer insolvency law [as] a new member of the family of programs (sic) designed to deal 
with the financial dangers of a changing world.”137  
Therefore, both post-crisis theoretical perspectives and the contemporary practice of the law 
present a strong case for rebalancing personal insolvency law towards its social insurance 
function, in expanding access to wide-ranging debt relief. The next part of this paper applies 
these broad ideas to the particular context of the recent Court of Appeal case of Places for People 
v Sharples, and the question it raised of personal insolvency law’s protection of debtor tenants 
from eviction. The paper shows how the ideas jostling for primacy in the preceding pages 
reappear in the Sharples case, though producing a contrasting conclusion.  
 
Figure 1: Most bankruptcies involve consumer, rather than business, debt. Source: Insolvency Service.  
 
137
 Kilborn, op. cit., n 1, at 595. 
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Figure 2: Most bankruptcies are initiated voluntarily by debtors. Source: Insolvency Service.  
 
Figure 3: Most debtors entering bankruptcy have few, if any, assets available for liquidation. Source: 
Insolvency Service.  
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FINDING A HOME FOR THE FRESH START POLICY 
 
In Places for People Homes Ltd. v Sharples,138 the Court of Appeal heard joined appeals in two 
cases where housing associations sought to evict tenants who had fallen behind on rent and 
sought insolvency protection. The Court answered negatively the central question raised of 
“whether a bankruptcy order… and a DRO… preclude the making of an order for possession of a 
dwelling let on an assured tenancy on the ground of rent arrears.”139 The question arose due to 
uncertainty regarding the scope of insolvency’s stay of any creditor’s “remedy in respect of a 
debt”, 140 and the effect of a legislative amendment that had exempted the debtor’s tenancy from 
the bankruptcy estate.141 One can in turn see this uncertainty as more broadly caused by 
personal insolvency law’s ambiguous aims. If the stay of enforcement serves to facilitate the 
maximisation of creditor recoveries by preserving estate assets for the creditor body, the stay 
has no reason to prevent an individual creditor from seizing an exempt asset such as a tenancy. 
Alternatively, if the stay serves debt relief aims, it must offer insurance against the debtor’s 
eviction, since any meaningful fresh start requires stable housing. The case thus required the 
court to make a stark choice between competing conceptions of the law’s aims.  
1. Personal Insolvency Law in a Housing Crisis  
 
In addition to what it says about personal insolvency law more broadly, the case is important in 
its own right as it relates to the significant contemporary housing problems that have developed 
during years of austerity, recession and uneven recovery.142 The case required personal 
insolvency law to confront the question of its role in responding to this crisis. Rental 
unaffordability and arrears have grown extraordinarily in recent years,143 while tenant evictions 
by County Court bailiffs have increased by over 50 per cent in the years 2010-2015.144 Counting 
formal court evictions, however, is likely to “underestimate drastically the prevalence of 
involuntary displacement among low-income renters”.145 These problems are thus also evident 
in informal home loss, such as the 2012-13 English Housing Survey finding that almost 18,000 
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139
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households’ last tenancy ended on landlords’ request due to non-payment of rent.146 Statutory 
homelessness data provides an even starker picture of renters’ financial difficulty. While levels 
of homelessness attributed directly to rent arrears remain low,147 homelessness arising from the 
termination of assured shorthold tenancies rose fourfold between 2009-10 and 2014-15 (Figure 
4).148 Again, these statistics understate the problem of homelessness, as current practices among 
financially constrained local authorities encourage applicants to avail of informal “housing 
options” over statutory homelessness applications.149 Alongside housing costs outpacing income 
growth,150 commentators look to austerity policies and reduced public housing support as 
drivers of these problems. Government has reduced housing allowance for private tenants, 
“capped” overall levels of benefit payments per household, and placed limits on eligible rents for 
social tenants under the policy colloquially known as the “bedroom tax”.151 One charity 
concludes that the “weakening [of] the safety net function of the social rented sector” has 
contributed to the serious rent affordability problem.152  
The Sharples case raised questions as to how personal insolvency law and policy should respond 
to the challenges of a shrinking social safety net and increased need for debtor protection from 
housing unaffordability and eviction. Insolvency policymakers have paid surprisingly little 
attention to this issue, in contrast to the frequent policy consideration of the treatment of a 
property-owning debtor’s home.153 A 2008 Insolvency Service review conceptualises “the 
bankrupt’s home” solely as a property owned by the debtor and makes no mention of renters.154 
This is despite tenants making up the large majority of debtors entering the personal insolvency 
system. While data are limited, only 8-14 per cent of bankruptcy debtors during the years 2003-
2008 owned homes,155 and in 2013-14 only 8 per cent of debtors held assets worth more than 
£5,000.156 Homeowners are ineligible for the “no income, no asset” DRO procedure. Just as the 
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over-indebted population contains disproportionate numbers of renters,157 personal insolvency 
very much is a renter’s law, though policymaking does not reflect this.158  
 
 
Figure 4: Statutory homelessness related to affordability of private sector rents has risen significantly. 
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government.  
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Figure 5: Source: Ministry of Justice  
2. Personal Insolvency Law and the Social Costs of Eviction 
 
While requiring novel application to the context of rental housing debt, the above justifications 
for personal insolvency law’s social insurance function support a policy case for providing relief 
to tenants facing eviction. Eviction generates not only considerable hardship for debtors, but 
also significant social costs justifying public policy responses. Literature identifies links between 
eviction and health problems,159 and substantial emotional and psychological costs may 
accompany eviction.160 Where the debtor can avoid the more drastic consequences of 
homelessness, she faces significant transaction costs of relocating to alternative 
accommodation.161 These include finding somewhere new to live,162 transporting belongings and 
abandoning non-transportable items.163 Upfront deposit payments and high costs of temporary 
housing arrangements lead many renters to incur further debt, often at high rates.164 
Investments in social networks may be lost,165 and eviction may force renters to move to areas 
of higher poverty and crime rates.166 An evicted debtor may encounter considerable difficulty in 
obtaining a new tenancy due to the adverse impact of bankruptcy and an eviction order on the 
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debtor’s credit history.167 The recognition of these costs of eviction “suggests that involuntary 
displacement is a cause, not simply a condition, of poverty and social suffering”.168 Eviction thus 
pushes debtors further from the fresh start promised by personal insolvency law and pushes 
housing market costs onto those least equipped to bear them. This should lead to declining 
economic participation among affected populations, as just one way in which eviction creates 
considerable negative externalities. Further social costs include the risk of adverse 
consequences such as detriment to education and development for children forced to undergo 
relocation.169 If multiple evictions strike in a particular area, this may increase stress and health 
problems among residents,170 while unoccupied premises also create distinct social costs.171 
Significantly, if the debtor is unable to find alternative accommodation in the private market or 
social rental sector, a duty may fall on the State under housing legislation to provide 
accommodation,172 with data above illustrating how this is an increasing occurrence.  
 
3. The Decision in Sharples: “the provision of shelter and a 'fresh start' to overburdened 
debtors"?173 
 
The Sharples case therefore decided whether courts should interpret the Housing Act 1988’s 
exemption of a debtor’s tenancy from the bankruptcy estate as a policy intervention addressing 
these externalities and extending personal insolvency’s debt relief to protection from eviction. 
Initially this appears to be the legislative intention behind the reform, as policymakers 
originally justified it in terms emphasising debtor rehabilitation: 
“… a bankrupt tenant whose tenancy has no financial value is put in an even more 
unfortunate position if he should lose his tenancy too. If he loses his home, he is not 
going to be in a position to sort out his affairs...”174 
The Court of Appeal nonetheless rejected this perspective, holding that the stay of creditor 
enforcement under the bankruptcy and DRO procedures did not prohibit a court order evicting 
a debtor for non-payment of rent. Relying on precedent predating the law reforms of the 1980s 
and 2000s described above,175 the court found that a possession order made on the ground of 
rent arrears under an assured tenancy176 is not a remedy in respect of the debt constituted by 
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the rent arrears. Rather, Etherton LJ stated that such an order “is a remedy which restores to the 
landlord full propriety rights, including rights of occupation and letting, in respect of the 
property.”177 The judge rejected the debtors’ arguments that the object of a claim for possession 
is to secure payment of arrears. Instead, he held that such a claim relates to a property right 
independent of a debt and aims “to restore to the landlord the right to full possession and 
enjoyment of the landlord’s property.”178 Thus under neither the bankruptcy nor DRO 
procedures do the moratoria on debt remedies prevent an order for possession being made.  
Alongside a literal interpretative approach, Etherton LJ also reached the decision by considering 
the purpose of bankruptcy’s stay of enforcement. The judge saw this as the protection of the 
debtor’s estate to prevent one creditor obtaining advantage over another and so to maximise 
the asset pool available for distribution to the body of creditors.179 Etherton LJ held that since an 
assured tenancy does not form part of the bankruptcy estate, this purpose would not be 
frustrated by allowing a landlord to obtain a possession order, as such order would not 
disadvantage other creditors.180 Etherton LJ’s view was that where individual enforcement only 
affects property unavailable to other creditors there is no function for the stay to fulfil. This 
clearly involves an understanding of the stay of enforcement as serving the sole aim of 
maximising the assets available for distribution to creditors.   
Such logic would not seem to extend to Debt Relief Orders. The DRO is open only to debtors 
lacking disposable income and assets and so involves “no provision relating to the collection, 
realisation or distribution of the debtor’s estate.”181 The judge nonetheless rejected the idea that 
this factor necessitated a re-evaluation of the scope of the moratorium. While acknowledging 
the “broad policy point that the object of a DRO is the relief from debt of those with limited 
means and limited debts”,182 the judgment abandoned a purposive approach in the DRO context. 
It instead reverted to a literalist interpretation which would avoid giving “an artificial meaning” 
to the wording of the relevant legislative provision.183 The court thus was comfortable adopting 
a purposive approach when the purpose in question was one of debt collection, but 
inconsistently was unwilling to allow the debt relief objective determine questions of legislative 
interpretation. The decision therefore evidences a clear prioritisation of the law’s debt 
collection objective, to the point of marginalising the debt relief aim. This logic overlooks the 
merits of insolvency law’s social insurance function and the public policy case for the law 
providing a safety net against eviction. Instead, it requires courts to decide the question of 
whether the law should protect debtors from eviction solely by reference to the purpose of 
maximising creditor returns. 
The second issue decided by the Court was that the status of rent arrears as a bankruptcy debt 
means that the stays prevent courts from entering judgment for the arrears, as the completion 
of the insolvency procedure discharges these sums. Similarly, the stays prevent courts from 
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making a suspended possession order conditional on arrears repayment (as this would qualify 
as a remedy in respect of a dischargeable debt). When deciding these issues, Etherton LJ 
returned to purposive interpretation, noting, “the DRO regime (and bankruptcy) is designed to 
restrict the recovery of debt and, when the process is complete, to eliminate it”.184 The judge 
then concluded that permitting debt recovery through a conditional possession order “would be 
contrary to that policy”. This reasoning on first reading appears to interpret expansively the 
debt discharge under both procedures and to recognise the law’s debt relief aim. In effect, 
however, the judge’s prior holding regarding the stay of enforcement frustrates “that policy” 
and illustrates the difficulty of attempts to balance the law’s competing aims by interpreting 
certain features by reference to one aim, and others by reference to another. Since insolvency 
protection will not stop eviction, in practice debtors will be denied this recognised statutory 
right to discharge, as to stave off eviction debtors will need to repay legally dischargeable rent 
arrears. As noted with regret by a judge following Sharples, even a debtor under DRO protection 
who makes current rent payments may suffer eviction based on a pre-existing conditionally 
suspended possession order.185 Advice agencies report that many property owners simply 
ignore a defaulting tenant’s entry into insolvency, or perversely take this event as cause to bring 
eviction proceedings.186 Consequently, the accepted practice among debt advisors following 
Sharples is that a debtor must continue to repay rent arrears while under such protection.187 
This practical reality renders ineffective Etherton LJ’s conceptual distinction between a remedy 
in respect of a debt and a remedy to restore landlords’ property rights;188 a distinction that also 
ignores empirical evidence that housing associations (and, one must equally assume, private 
landlords) clearly see possession proceedings as a debt collection method.189 Thus, the Sharples 
decision has effectively created a divergence between law and practice and undermined 
statutory provisions in obliging debtors in practice to repay arrears where legislation provides 
for their discharge from such debts. For those debtors lacking the means to pay, personal 
insolvency law will provide no protection against eviction. 
4. Sharples and the Social Insurance Function of Personal Insolvency Law: Spreading the Risks of 
a Debt Based Economy 
 
Despite Etherton LJ’s words regarding debt discharge, further comments of the judge seem to 
acknowledge that the real point at issue was whether insolvency’s stay of enforcement prevents 
eviction. This is evident in Etherton LJ’s policy justifications for his decision, which centred on 
concerns regarding the case’s implications for housing providers and other non-defaulting 
tenants. If insolvency indeed discharges rent arrears, then property owners have already lost 
these sums and the law imposes no additional costs on them by taking the further step of 
preventing eviction. In fact, if eviction is avoided property owners might benefit from the 
rehabilitation of a financially troubled tenant into a debt free occupant, assumedly now better 
able to keep current on rents. This was far from the view of Etherton LJ, who saw real costs for 
property owners if unable to evict defaulting tenants, as well as for “non-defaulting tenants who 
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may have to pay higher rents to compensate for the landlord’s lost revenue.”190 The judge 
cautioned that it  
“could be financially catastrophic for [social] landlords to be unable to recover 
possession from persistent non-payers and could threaten the availability of social 
housing to meet the great demand from the large number of people who are 
economically disadvantaged and seek suitable and affordable permanent 
accommodation.”191  
This reasoning calls into question the legitimacy of household debt relief generally, in a manner 
epitomising the abovementioned classical objections to consumer and social protection 
measures.  
As well as showing a lack of faith in the possibility of debtor rehabilitation, Etherton LJ’s view of 
the debtor as a “persistent non-payer”192 suggests an underlying assumption of debtor 
culpability that raises the “spectre of moral hazard”.193 Concerns of ex post moral hazard (that a 
debtor may exaggerate her need for debt relief) arise in this context since protection against 
eviction might potentially create incentives for debtors not to make all reasonable efforts to pay 
rent, a possibility recognised by commentators on the US bankruptcy code.194 Moral hazard 
reasoning does not call for a denial of insurance where it could create perverse incentives, 
however, but rather the structuring of insurance to address such incentives.195 Thus, eviction 
moratorium rules in insolvency could alleviate concerns for example by permitting eviction in 
cases where a debtor is current on all repayments other than rent (suggesting that the debtor 
was deliberately withholding rent). The law could also permit eviction on grounds other than 
non-payment of rent, and could learn from amendments to the US Bankruptcy Code that 
introduced exceptions to the stay on eviction.196 The law could also treat exceptionally cases in 
which the rent would be unaffordable even after discharge. Ex ante moral hazard concerns of 
irresponsible borrowing are less significant in the context of rented properties than for other 
consumer borrowing, however. Housing is a necessity, rather than a luxury purchase made by a 
“spendthrift” debtor.197 Therefore, moral hazard concerns and the problem of potential 
“persistent non-payment” do not appear to justify the outcome in Sharples.  
In respect of Etherton LJ’s second classic policy objection that protecting insolvent tenants from 
eviction would increase costs for property owners and subsequently for non-defaulting tenants, 
the social insurance function of bankruptcy sees this as an outcome to be pursued rather than a 
“catastrophe”. It seeks to spread the costs of a debt-based economy more widely in order to 
address externalities and in particular debt overhang problems that result from the market 
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allocation of losses onto those least able to bear them. Insurance theory would reallocate these 
losses onto housing associations and holders of property portfolios, given they are better placed 
than debtors (and third parties) both to bear these costs and to prevent them from arising.198 
Property owners, like all lenders, spread and hedge losses, and include default losses in 
calculating rents charged across their range of tenants. While this process is difficult for smaller 
owners, those engaging in the commercial activity of renting property for profit must bear 
accompanying risks and price them accordingly, as traders who do not understand their 
businesses have no right to remain artificially in the market.199 Landlords may be less equipped 
than financial institutions to prevent default through informed credit extension practices. They 
nonetheless benefit from access to credit reference systems and remain much better placed 
than individual renters to conduct complex risk assessments regarding tenants’ future 
likelihood of defaulting. Personal insolvency commentators suggest that special considerations 
might apply to non-profit social landlords of the type at interest in Sharples,200 and indeed 
Etherton LJ’s judgment emphasises how these property owners’ tenancies serve not commercial 
objectives but a “special social need”.201 Nonetheless one must recognise that the shift of social 
housing provision from local authorities to housing associations was motivated by politicians’ 
deliberate choice to instigate a “business ethos” in this sector, and accordingly to treat housing 
associations similarly to private landlords.202 Housing associations practice such commercial 
risk management techniques as conducting affordability assessments before letting.203 This is 
particularly the case given the increasing consolidation of the sector into a small number of very 
large providers, since “the bigger the organisation, the more it can insulate itself from external 
risks.”204 Furthermore, recent legislative changes have authorised social landlords to charge 
rents closer to market rates, while some larger associations are “moving their focus away from 
housing those in greatest need towards a more diversified tenant base”.205 As housing 
associations act more like commercial operators, justifications grow for treating them as such in 
personal insolvency law. Undoubtedly, particularly thorny policy issues arise at this “interface 
between legislation governing the provision of… [social] accommodation… and insolvency 
legislation”.206 It is clear nonetheless that the social insurance model of bankruptcy, and its 
strong argument in favour of eviction protection, should feature in any policy assessment.  
Regarding the passing of these property owner costs onto non-defaulting tenants, again 
bankruptcy’s social insurance function seeks precisely this outcome. The payment of an 
increased premium (in higher rents) should reduce externalities in producing a truer cost of 
credit/housing, while also offering tenants insurance against the risk of over-indebtedness and 
eviction that faces all renters in volatile economic conditions. Etherton LJ’s words hint that the 
law’s provision of increased eviction protection would not only raise rents, but also lead 
property owners to “ration” tenancies and refuse to rent to certain groups perceived to be at 
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high risk of future insolvency. One must note, however, that landlords already carry out credit 
history checks to screen prospective tenants, reducing access considerably.207 Further, if this 
warning rings true and markets can affordably provide only insecure housing devoid of 
insurance against economically and socially harmful eviction, then this suggests that law and 
policy should revisit openly the balance between public and market provision. The current 
equilibrium, with public provision increasingly replaced by reliance on ensuring market access, 
has created a necessary new social policy role for law and regulation in allowing citizens to 
retain “basic… services even when they can no longer afford them through the market.”208 
Policymakers have recognised this in their support of defaulting mortgage debtors following the 
financial crisis,209 but it is also time for the law to consider in the rental context the appropriate 
balance between ensuring freedom to access housing and freedom to maintain housing. 210  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The decision in Sharples exemplifies reasoning common in judicial211 and policy decision-
making in the field of personal insolvency, characterised by an unwillingness to embrace wholly 
the fresh start policy. Accordingly, the law offers only ‘adulterated debt relief’,212 conditioned by 
the persistent view that it should primarily serve the interests of creditors. A consequence of 
the law choosing contract enforcement as the predominant regulatory approach213 is its 
inability to respond to contemporary challenges and to fulfil its potential to produce positive 
policy outcomes. This article does not argue that insolvency law is an ideal remedy for social 
problems better addressed by the welfare system. The law nonetheless must recognise the 
practical and policy context in which it operates, and its de facto role of last resort insurer 
against debt crises at both the micro and macro levels. In an important article in the then-
nascent consumer bankruptcy literature, Niemi asked whether personal insolvency law should 
aim to cure a market failure or a social problem.214 In an increasingly financialised world, it 
appears ever more difficult to draw such a boundary between the market and the social. Private 
consumer credit and housing markets increasingly replace public provision, but failures in these 
markets trigger significant social problems for troubled households, while the resultant 
distribution of losses also generates negative aggregate economic effects.215 Contemporary 
scholarship advances a strong policy case for understanding personal insolvency law as a form 
of social insurance, a means of distributing more equitably and efficiently the risks inherent in a 
debt-based economy. This calls for recognition of the law’s provision of wide-ranging debt relief 
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as its primary objective, to be emphasised over an alternative aim of attempting to produce 
maximum returns to creditors from what is often a debtor’s meagre income and assets. 
Opposition to this approach is rooted in concerns of moral hazard and fears of reducing credit 
supply, as evidenced in Etherton LJ’s reasoning in Sharples. Analysis of the Global Financial 
Crisis and Great Recession, however, illustrates the limited control individuals hold over the 
dynamics of credit and demonstrates the great risks of excessive debt flows. 216 As household 
debt creeps again towards pre-crisis levels,217 and austerity policies require citizens to turn ever 
more to markets for basic needs, it seems an apt time to reimagine the role of personal 
insolvency law as an insurer of last resort against the contemporary risks of our debt-burdened 
society.  
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